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COVENANTS AND CONSTITUTIONS
RichardA. Epsteint
Covenants and constitutions: strange bedfellows, but more than
alliteration unites them. In this brief paper I shall explore the relationship between them. In order to orient the discussion, my use of
the term "covenants" includes all forms of servitudes, easements,
and restrictions that one person can place on another's lands.
"Constitutions" are the documents that identify and entrench the
fundamental law of a state or nation, on matters of both structure
and individual rights.
At first blush, the two appear to be polar opposites. The law of
covenants is the province only of a hardy band of real estate lawyers
with the temerity to master a complex and imposing body of rules;
vertical and horizontal privity; affirmative and negative covenants;
matters in esse and in posse; the touch and concern requirement;
notice, actual and constructive; and the ins-and-outs of recordation
statutes. Constitutions, by contrast, are the province of us all, the
stuff of Senate confirmation hearings, and speak to the eternal and
universal truths that bind us into a nation.
Appearances can be deceiving, however, I believe that the law
of covenants offers an intelligent blueprint for the analysis of constitutional principles. Covenants may govern party-walls and rights of
way over back country roads. Their subject matter may be both
well-defined and permanent, and they may bind as few as two parties. But there is nothing about the logic of covenants that restricts
them to two-party transactions with simple objectives. Covenants
are similar in this regard to corporations, which can be closed or
public. There are no external limits on the number of parties who
can participate in a contract or on the type of issues that it can govern. The logic of contracting is the logic of unanimous consent. As
the number of parties to a system of covenants becomes greater and
the issues involved more complex, the polar differences between
covenants and constitutions diminish. The closer we look at these
covenants, the more they look like mini-constitutions. The common
t James Parker Hall Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This paper is an
expanded version of the remarks delivered to the Property Section of the American Association of Law Schools in MiamiJanuary 8, 1987. I would like to thank Stewart Sterk
for his valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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literary image of a constitution as a social contract, or even a social
covenant, has more literal truth than is often supposed.
I
COVENANTS

Let us set the stage for analysis with a short discussion of the
function and purpose of covenants. To understand their critical
role in modem land transactions, it is best first to envision the circumstances in which covenants have no more than peripheral importance. Thus suppose for the moment that land is a very cheap
commodity that can be effectively utilized only if owned in fairly
large quantities (say for grazing or farming). Under these circumstances, there may be very little need for any system of covenants at
all. Each person can live side by side with his neighbor, and each
can rejoice in exclusive ownership of an unencumbered fee simple
absolute in possession. The operative principle is that good fences
make good neighbors. But this simple property arrangement has its
Achilles heel: two people cannot share a single resource.' In consequence there might be some underutilization of land. Nonetheless
these losses are perhaps smaller than the costs necessary to correct
them. Covenants are not cheap to draft and enforce, especially in
the era before recordation. So long as transaction costs are positive,
the set of efficient solutions cannot involve the realization of all possible gains from trade. Where the gains from trade are smaller than
the sum of both sides' transaction costs, then the trade will not take
place.
Now let us suppose that the value of land has increased dramatically, whether from an increased demand for farm produce, or
from an increased demand for housing in an especially fashionable
part of town. Under these circumstances, the balance shifts between
the two costs identified above. The losses from the underutilization
of land become very large, relative to the transaction costs of creating some legal system that allows more intensive use of the land,
and the system of joint control and divided use that it requires.
Once the costs of contracting become lower than the economic
gains from contracting, we should expect to see voluntary contracts
emerge. An increase in the frequency of covenants goes hand in
hand with increases in underlying real estate values.
One question is what can the law do in order to minimize the
losses from the underutilization of real property. At some macrolevel, a wide range of public control devices can have enormous in1 For further discussion of this problem and the bilateral monopoly problems it
creates, see Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1987).
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fluence on land utilization: systems of zoning, rent control, and taxation are but three types of potent government regulation. But for
this discussion on the law of covenants, I shall put those institutional
tools aside, and concentrate solely on the private mechanisms of
transfer involved in creating complex structures of divided ownership in real property, with reference here only to transactions be2
tween neighbors.
Within this narrow focus, what the law can do is to try to reduce
the transaction costs of the voluntary arrangements needed to exploit real estate within the confines established by law. The payoff
here should be evident: the lower these costs, the more likely it is
that private agreements can counteract even small underutilizations
of real property. This tendency should be a general social good regardless of the market or regulatory determinants of land value,
3
positive or negative.
A number of legal and institutional developments have fostered desirable voluntary exchanges. It is worthwhile to spend time
on two: recordation and common plan building schemes.
A.

Recordation

The system of recordation is an indispensable aid for the effective use of any form of covenant. In the age before recordation, no
one could be sure whether a restriction binding upon the immediate
parties could also be enforced by or against third parties. The resulting uncertainty was very large, and it fed back into the initial
willingness to control land by covenants. As land is permanent, it is
only a matter of time before the original parties to the transaction
sell their interests or die. Covenantees want to be able to make decisions about the construction of long-term improvements, but cannot do so if the protection that they have purchased can be defeated
whenever the original covenantor makes a strategic sale to a third
party who is then rid of the covenant. The covenantor, for his part,
will not be able, ex ante, to command the highest price if he cannot
assure the convenantee that his successor in title will be bound by
the restriction in question. The first transaction itself may therefore
abort, so that the subsequent purchaser is denied the benefit of the
purchase that ties the acquisition of the land to acceptance of the
2 For more comprehensive efforts in this regard, see Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681
(1973); Sterk, supra note 1.
3 External forms of regulation need not reduce the value of land, but could well
increase it. Thus a zoning ordinance that prevents the easy development of unimproved
land will reduce the value of that land. Yet at the same time it will increase the value of
competing lands that have already been developed. The case for or against zoning depends on the relative magnitudes of the shifts in value and the ways of finding them out.
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servitude. The point remains true, moreover, even if no cash
changes hands, as frequently happens when each party's consideration is a reciprocal covenant (such as a covenant not to build above a
certain height).
The concern with binding strangers did not preclude the running of covenants before the rise of recordation statutes. Roughly
speaking, the rule then was that covenants could only bind subsequent takers if they had notice, actual or constructive, of the covenant. 4 The uncertainties about notice were powerful enough that
they doubtless precluded many useful transactions from taking
place at all. With recordation, the problem of notice disappears in
all but the most unusual case. 5 The covenantee simply records his
interest in the appropriate deed or plot index; title companies then
memorialize it on their own records; and all subsequent takers are
now in position to assess the state of the title, and act accordingly,
either by adjusting the purchase price for land to take into account
the restrictions that benefit or burden it, or by not purchasing at
all. 6 The work is all routine and ministerial-a notable social triumph of the humdrum.
In my view, the recording system renders unnecessary many of
the arcane features of the law of covenants that might have made
sense in the prior age. 7 The requirement that covenants "touch and
concern" the land may well have made sense in an age before recordation; those covenants that did touch and concern the land were
more likely to be detected by subsequent purchasers than those that
were purely personal to the parties. Similarly, it might have been
more difficult from an inspection of the premises to discover
whether the seller had undertaken some affirmative obligation to a
neighboring landowner. But now that the system of recordation is
in place, the notice issue is typically solved in an explicit, sensible,
4
The modem law starts with Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch.
1848), which allowed restrictive covenants to run in equity against the purchasers who
took with notice of them.
5 Professor Alexander is more uneasy with recordation. See infra pages 910-14.
6
The point was well understood in Tulk:
[Tihe question is, not whether the covenant runs with the land, but
whether a party shall be permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of
which he purchased. Of course, the price would be affected by the covenant, and nothing could be more inequitable than that the original purchaser should be able to sell the property the next day for a greater price,
in consideration of the assignee being allowed to escape from the liability
which he had himself undertaken.
2 Ph. at 777-78, 41 Eng. Rep. at 1144.
7
See Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1353 (1982).
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and well-nigh decisive fashion, rendering unnecessary the need for
the clumsy proxies that still survive in the law.
The limitation of valid covenants to those that touch and concern land, and the prohibition on affirmative obligations, are not, I
believe, of much practical consequence, because there are very few
persons who really would want as a business matter to tie either type
of undertaking to the ownership of real property-who would want
the assignee of a covenantor to prepare his income taxes? Even so,
some famous institutional cases have turned on either or both these
requirements. Thus the decision in Neponsit Property Owners'Association, Inc. v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank 8 was necessary to quell
some residual doubt whether the obligation to pay money to a property owners' association touched and concerned the land, or fell
afoul of New York's stringent rule against affirmative covenants. 9
Clearly no common ownership association could survive at all without these standard covenants, any more than a government could
survive without any power to tax. Faced with the prospect of artificial limitations from the law of real covenants knocking out an essential form of self-governance-the connection to constitutions
should be getting clearer!f-the court held the covenants enforceable against an assignee with notice, without taking the more radical
step of casting these archiac tests out of the common law of New
York State. The result in Neponsit is a happy one, but it could have
been better reached by jettisoning the older restrictions on covenants, now that recordation statutes are in place.
A contrary position on recordation and notice is taken by Professor Alexander in his provocative paper, Freedom, Coercion, and the
Law of Servitudes. 1 His attack takes place on several levels and deserves an answer here. His most general argument is that one cannot assume that interested parties are rational or understand the
terms found in covenants. "[P]eople do engage in irrational behavior."lI Stated in this form, the argument extends far more broadly
than the law of covenants. Indeed, if treated as a general description of human conduct, it undermines the possibilities of any form
of intelligent organization whatsoever. Under this view, private bargains are unacceptable because they are doomed by ignorance and
exploitation. Yet by the same token, political solutions are doomed
as well, because irrationality is hardly cured in a regime that requires imperfect actors to navigate the many pitfalls of collective ac8 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
9 Miller v. Clary, 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114 (1913).
1o Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73
(198E.).
11

Id

CORNELL

L.

REv.

883

at 895.
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tion. If people cannot contract intelligently, then how can they
vote? The assumption of systemic irrationality is a general nonstarter from which only universal skepticism follows. It does not
serve as the foundation for any debate focused on the role of notice
or on any other mid-level problem in the common law.
At a more specific level, Professor Alexander argues that the
value of depending on a recordation system is overstated because
gaps remain within the system of notice even when recordation is
the norm. While recordation does afford notice in most cases, it
does not do so in all. In some cases the rules of "inquiry notice"
may require purchasers under common building plans to draw inferences of covenants that are not recorded in their own chain of
title. 12 In other cases, the subsequent purchaser may be put on inquiry notice by the condition of the land itself.' s These cases of
inquiry notice do raise an important challenge to any system of recordation, for there is no doubt that on some occasions the law will
impute notice to parties who had none in fact.
Nonetheless this objection has to be kept in perspective. It is
critical to ask how large the number of cases involving inquiry notice
is, relative to the total number of cases in question. As to covenants,
my suspicion is that the number is small, if only because anyone
smart enough to understand the law of inquiry notice is also smart
14
enough to take the routine precaution of recording his interest. It
is well-nigh inconceivable today, where the developer invariably engages legal counsel, that there will be defective recordation of the
covenants binding any large condominium or cooperative. In some
sense, therefore, it would be possible to protect third parties across
the board by demanding (as do race recordation statutes) perfect
recordation in order to protect the original covenantee. This alternative has its costs as well: doubtless some persons with inquiry notice also have notice in fact, but will nonetheless be protected by the
race statutes. To eliminate those costs, the rules of inquiry notice
are designed to ferret out those cases where purchasers likely have
actual notice, or at least "reason to know," of an unrecorded
covenant.
It is an empirical question whether the effort to undo one sort
of error (not binding those who have actual notice or reason to
know of a covenant) only creates, a greater error in the opposite diSee, e.g., Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925).
13 See, e.g., Miller v. Green, 264 Wis. 159, 58 N.W.2d 704 (1953).
14 For a comparison, see Langbein, SubstantialCompliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 489 (1975) (testator's substantial compliance with Wills Act should suffice). Persons who are aware of the formalities required by the Wills Act can be expected not to
exploit any residual loophole left by the noncompliance rule.
12
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rection (binding those without actual notice). That question is
probably pretty close, but the low popularity of pure race statutes,
and the widespread sympathy for some inquiry notice rules, is entitled to at least a little respect on a matter where "hands-on" experience probably counts. Sometimes the rules of inquiry notice rightly
exclude persons with actual notice. Professor Alexander's argument
at best makes a case for race statutes. But it affords no reason to
reject the general proposition that third party purchasers should not
be bound by notice, especially when recorded. The existence of
some small chinks in the system is only an inevitable reflection of
the error that arises whenever transaction costs are positive.1 5 It is
not a reason to undo the system of covenants.
Professor Alexander's next argument turns on what, borrowing
from Professor Mark Kelman, 16 he terms the "bundling" problem.
"The promisor's successor may have bought the land even though
she did not want it with the restriction because she was unable to
control all of the theoretically available terms." 1 7 Yet this argument
surely proves too much. No one party ever controls all theoretically
available terms. Any bargain in any context requires each party to
give up something of value in order to obtain something else. The
engine driving all bargains is that each party attaches a higher subjective value to the goods received than she attaches to the goods
surrendered. Yet to say this is to say that every contract of sale requires both sides to "bundle" some commodity which is "unwanted" with some other commodity that is desired. To prohibit
such "bundling" would make it quite impossible to sell shoelaces
with shoes or for a dealer to take a trade-in on a new car. It may well
be that bargains would come out quite differently if everyone were
prepared to endure the prohibitive costs of having separate contracts for each item under negotiation. But the logic of mutual benefit for the parties, which drives the institution of contract, is
satisfied when goods are exchanged in bundles just as much as when
they are bought and sold separately. The subsequent purchaser
who takes with notice of the covenant is better off with the bundle
than she is without the deal.
Of course it would be nice for Professor Alexander's successor
if she could obtain the property without servitude: everyone prefers
having more to having less. By the same token it would be nice for
the original covenantor to obtain the higher price by selling the retained land free of the covenant. But alas, there are still the desires
15 For a further examination of recordation, see Baird &Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299 (1984).

A GUIDE

16

See M.

17

Alexander, supra note 10, at 894.

KELMAN,

TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES

107-09 (1987).
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of the original covenantee, and his desires are wholly ignored if the
transaction between covenantor and subsequent purchaser is permitted to deprive him of the benefit of his bargain. The general
principle that contracts should not be allowed to bind strangers applies with as much force to covenants as it applies to goods. Where
the successor in title does not have notice of a secret agreement between the original covenantor and covenantee, then she is the stranger who needs protection. But where she does have notice, then the
stranger to the transaction is the original covenantor, done in by the
joint machinations of the original covenantee and the subsequent
purchaser. A rule that prevented the enforcement of these covenants generally would be an unmitigated disaster to subsequent
purchasers as a class because it would remove from the market a
large portion of the supply of affordable housing and land. Similarly, a rule that allows these covenants to be enforced, subject to
the broad "discretion" of some future court,18 introduces a degree
of uncertainty that ex ante works against the interests of all concerned. And the same can be said of any rule that does not enforce
covenants when conditions have changed sharply.' 9
Professor Alexander tries to buttress his two specific considerations with a third: the successor in title is really not a promisor at
all. Taking a leaf from the earlier writings of Professor Rundell, he
argues 20 that the "problem is not 'What can parties do with their
own?' but 'What can parties to a promise do to persons who are not
parties?" 2 ' Professor Rundell then makes his argument in still more
general terms:
To give to one a power to make another a promisor is, most of us
would instinctively feel, a dangerous power. Is it the less dangerous because it is limited in its scope to the successors to property
owned by the promisor? Probably so, but the limitation only
makes it less dangerous. Certainly, no one has ever supposed that
the owner of a chattel could make promises which would bind his
22
successors merely because they were his successors.
Rundell's argument fundamentally misunderstands what is at
stake in the law of notice. The issue with covenants is not whether
the covenantor can bind a total stanger, or even make promises to
18

See Alexander, supra note 10, at 893-94.

19

See infra pages 919-21.
Alexander, supra note 10, at 894-95.
21
Rundell, Judge Clark on the American Law Institute's Law of Real Covenants: A Comment, 53 YALE LJ.312, 314 (1944). Rundell wrote in response to Clark, The American Law
Institute's Law of Real Covenants, 52 YALE LJ. 699 (1943), which was generally critical of
the ALI's effort to preserve the older requirements of horizontal privity, and touch and
concern.
22 Rundell, supra note 21, at 314.
20
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his covenantee that bind his successor. Rather, the issue is whether
the successor in title, who takes with notice, has assumed that obligation himself with the voluntary decision to purchase the land. It is
both the decision to purchase and the notice that constitute the consent, not either in isolation from the other. So long as the legal
consequences of the transaction are spelled out in advance, it is not
dangerous at all to say to the real estate purchaser that in order to
buy the sweet, he must take it subject to the bitter. Quite the opposite, the law of recordation permits the parties to realize gains not
otherwise obtainable, by having confidence in their transactions
when these are sequential and not simultaneous. The general principle, that no two persons by contract can bind a stranger, is
designed to curtail the social losses of destructive bargaining. If A
and B could contract in ways that bound C, then we would see an
endless cycle of contracts in which small groups of individuals would
confiscate the wealth of others. The prohibition on theft, necessary
to civilized society, could be circumvented by a simple private agreement. But once the so-called victim of the trade can protect himself
by refusing to do business at all, or by altering the terms of the
purchase price, then the endless cycle of theft and exploitation is
stopped in its tracks. The basic insight of Tulk v. Moxhay is as valid
today as it ever was.
B.

Common Building Plans

The previous discussion shows how the rules of recordation
help facilitate transactions that bind three or more persons. Recordation itself is not sufficient for that purpose and the law has also
developed effective rules to allow covenants to be created that benefit and bind a large number of persons, such as the members of a
subdivision, condominium, or cooperative. There is an evident
transactional problem here if covenants can only exist between two
persons in privity. The extent of the difficulty is fully revealed by a
simple mathematical calculation. If there are n persons, then there
must be pairwise contracts among all of them, so that:
n
Y n-1
i=1
is the minimum number of separate contracts to bind everyone to
everyone else. Alternatively, if it is possible for all persons to bind
each other by dealing with a common party (usually the developer)
who stands at the middle of the circle, then n contracts (one between each person and the developer) suffice to create a network in
which all persons can be bound and benefitted by a set of reciprocal
contracts.
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Where n is very small, the transactional difference between the
two methods of contracting is not significant. In order to contract
with a common agent at the middle it is necessary to set up that
agent but the costs of that institution can be spread only over a very
small number of contracts. If the effort is to link only three people,
there will have to be three contracts no matter whether they go
around the sides of the triangle or through a fourth point at the
middle. The system of three pairwise contracts, moreover, might be
cheaper because the costs of setting up the common party at the
center are avoided. As the numbers get large, as is typical with
modem real estate when land becomes valuable, then there is a pronounced advantage to contracting through the central point. Thus
for n equal to 100, the number of pairwise contracts required is, by
the well-known formula:
n
Z n-1 = n(n-1)/2, equal to 4950,
i=1
while the number of contracts through the center is only 100. At
that point it would long since have been cost effective to incur the
heavy front-end fixed costs of instituting a central party through
whom all individual landowners are able to contract. The marginal
costs of adding a single new member to the group are low when
governance runs through the center, but they would be astronomical if 101 new contracts have to be separately formed. In addition,
the costs of maintaining the contract network are reduced as well,
for no longer is it necessary to modify, for example, 4950 existing
separate contracts. Instead it should be possible to make changes in
one single master arrangement in accordance with predetermined
28
decision rules.
The law of covenants had an intuitive sense of the real economies of scale that have developed in this area. The rules for common building plans or schemes allow a promoter to insure that all
purchasers of individual units stand in a position of perfect parity
with one another, regardless of when they purchase their units, by
inserting proper ("intent to run") language in the original deeds
and faithfully recording all documents. The flexibility of this way of
doing business should be manifest. The developer can now assure
the first round of buyers that subsequent takers will be bound;
thereafter, the developer can also assure subsequent rounds of buyers that prior takers are bound. Buyers can remain happily ignorant
of the details of the scheme, precisely because it works so well.
Over time, individual units may fluctuate in value, but these differ23

See the discussion of majority rule infra pages 921-24.
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ences can be handled by adjustments in purchase price or financing
terms without any alteration of the basic network of covenants.
In effect, the rules show the advantages of standard form contracts when there are a large number of parties. By reducing transaction costs, common building plans effectively allow vast numbers
of individuals to make use of certain common areas or to benefit
from the mutual restrictions and requirements on use. They become ever more important today when the high price of land makes
the ideal of separate and self-contained ownership a luxury that few
people who want glamor in the city or quiet at the beach can afford.
Professor Alexander sees in these rules some "particularly insidious form of coercion because it purports to effectuate private
intentions rather than acknowledging that private volition is being
sacrificed for the sake of some collective good." 24 But where is the
coercion or sacrifice? Of coercion there is none, unless the discrete
purchase or sale is infected with duress or fraud, issues that the ordinary law of contract can handle (as it has for ages). Of sacrifice
there is none either: the system of sequential contracts will only go
forward if, at every point in the chain, both parties to the contract
think that they are better off with the agreement than without it.
The constant effort to conflate close choices and hard bargains with
coercion is of a piece with the effort to conflate agreement with
theft, and scarcity with coercion. Of course there will be some
transactions in which prospective consumers find themselves making close marginal calls; that is not evidence of coercion, but only of
negatively sloped demand curves.
II
THE PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE:

EXTERNALITIES,

TRANSACTION COSTS, AND INTERGENERATIONAL

EFFECTS

The combined effect of the recordation and building plan rules
should by now be clear. Recordation is an effective way to control
the externalities associated with covenants, while building plans reduce the cost of transacting among large numbers of covenantees.
Nonetheless several related inquiries need still to be answered: Are
there any externalities that recordation does not address? Are there
any transactional difficulties that cannot be overcome by the principles of serial contracting made possible by the building plan rules?
What implications do these difficulties have for the enforcement of
covenants?
The most obvious way in which recordation systems control the
24

Alexander, supra note 10, at 896.
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problem of externalities is to give notice to the rest of the world of
the state of the title of any person whom a network of covenants
binds or benefits. Within this framework, some might fear a different kind of externality: that the substance of that network of covenants will be in some way objectionable. This fear is misplaced,
because the original developer (like the corporate promoter intent
upon maximizing his profit from a venture) has all the right incentives to offer the ideal mix of burdens and benefits. If he offers inferior terms, then his return from sales will suffer because the price
that he can command in the market for the units will be reduced. It
seems clear from common practice that few developers think that
their unit owners are happy with the limited "no invasion" type restrictions that are associated with the common law of nuisance. Nuisance-type prohibitions against noise, smells, and discharges remain
part and parcel of any common ownership system, but they do not
begin to exhaust the class of restrictions that are routinely included
in any common real estate venture. Most planned developments
contain detailed restrictions concerning height, decor, and maintenance. These restrictions may look byzantine to an outsider, but
they are likely to make sense because the party who imposes them
has everything to lose if they are made either too stringent or too
relaxed.
Some have questioned whether there are certain kinds of externalities that the above analysis does not reach. 2 5 Here in particular
three types should be discussed: monopoly, discrimination, and intergenerational effects-the last with reference to the doctrine of
changed conditions. 2 6 All involve possible harms to third persons
that might not be internalized by an original owner of the land. At
this point, however, the discussion takes an important change in direction, for none of the concerns. so raised is in any sense unique to
the law of covenants (in the way that the privity restriction or the
touch and concern requirement are). Instead, all three of these issues raise challenges that could in principle be lodged against any
private contract, regardless of subject matter. The key to understanding them, therefore, is to regard them as part of the broader
question of what limitations the law ought generally to impose on
freedom of contract so as to protect third parties.
A.

Monopoly
As regards monopoly, the source of the concern is that the sin-

25
See, e.g., Sterk, Freedomfrom Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IowA L. REv. 615 (1985).
26 Id. at 621-23, 643-44. The problem of intergenerational effects raises not only
externality but also transaction cost issues. See infra pages 920-25.
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gle developer of a large project may be able to exert some market
power. The argument is always plausible with regard to land because it is an asset, fixed in location, that can have (almost by definition) only imperfect substitutes located some distance away. The
question of monopoly power, however, generates different responses for different kinds of covenants. Those restrictions that are
perfectly reciprocal (e.g., that relate to appearance and height) do
not seem to raise any concerns under the monopoly model. If there
is a monopoly problem in this context, it arises from the ability of
the original developer (who may be protected by zoning restrictions
on nearby parcels) to extract a monopoly price from his own purchasers. If some form of public control is found necessary, it need
not be tied to the law of covenants. For in his effort to extract monopoly rents, the developer, as already observed, has every incentive to supply the ideal set of restrictions for all his parcels: he can
maximize his monopoly return in this way. The proper types of response, therefore, are numerous. The law could place some restrictions on price, for which the risks of overreaction are manifest; it
could limit the size of certain subdivisions under common ownership, but only at the cost of some arguable efficiencies in operation;
or ideally, it could remove whatever legal restrictions block the entry of other developers into the local market.
The situation becomes much trickier where the restrictions in
question are not reciprocal, but are designed to insure the exclusion
of certain kinds of business from the development, such as when the
developer agrees to let a second fast-food chain into his project only
upon approval of the first. 2 7 This system raises an obvious problem
for commercial developments where such covenants are important,
but not for residential ones. Again there is nothing special about
the analysis which depends upon the degree of market power exacted and the costs of introducing any remedy to set matters on
their proper course. I shall not consider the point further here.
B.

Antidiscrimination

Restrictive covenants have also been used to exclude persons
from certain real estate developments because of their race or reli28
gion. As a matter of American constitutional and statutory law,
these covenants are now universally regarded as illegal, precisely
because of their adverse effects on third parties. My purpose here is
not to assess the desirability of the constitutional rules or statutes
but only to stress again the general point. Any concern with antidis27 See, e.g., Howard D.Johnson Co. v. Parkside Dev. Corp., 169 Ind. App. 379, 348
N.E.2d 656 (1976).
28 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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crimination is best attacked head on and does not raise any
problems with restrictive covenants that are not also found, say,
with employment or with housing generally. It is very doubtful,
therefore, that any distinctive doctrine of covenant law can begin to
reach this issue. Restrictive covenants of this sort touch and concern the land, are negative in effect, are clear as to both intent and
meaning, and are capable of recordation. Yet all this only shows
that the problem is better handled by other legal rules which have
discrimination, race, and religion at their core, and not by the law of
covenants.
C.

Intergenerational Effects: The Problem of
Changed Conditions

The last possible source of externalities has to do with the intergenerational effects of a system of restrictive covenants. Within
the traditional legal framework this problem is brought to the fore
in connection with the so-called doctrine of changed conditions.
This doctrine holds that a restrictive covenant is no longer enforceable, at least without modification, when the social and environrhental conditions existing when the covenant was created no longer
apply. 29 In effect the doctrine of changed conditions allows the
courts to expunge covenants from the records, or at least modify
their provisions, once the court determines that the covenants no
longer serve the purposes for which they were first introduced. In
one sense, therefore, the doctrine of changed conditions is a slightly
more robust form of the doctrine of frustration of purpose as it exists in the general law of contract. But the doctrine of changed conditions has a more distinctive and coercive cast. Courts may invoke
it to invalidate covenants notwithstanding the parties' express contractual intent to be bound in perpetuity unless released by contrary
unanimous agreement.
The battleground here is a familiar one: should the doctrine of
changed conditions operate as a plausible default rule or as a rule of
public regulation? I have already taken the position that it should
fill the former, and more modest, office once the recordation system
gives all parties notice of the relevant conditions. 3° So long as all
the original parties have themselves taken into account the need for
29
For defenses of the doctrine, see French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes:
Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1982); Reichman, Toward a Unified
Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177 (1982); Sterk, supra note 25, at 652-54.
30
See Epstein, supra note 7, at 1364-68, which is criticized in Sterk, supra note 25, at
634-635. Sterk notes, inter alia, that my general hostility to the doctrine of changed
conditions should lead me to be hostile to many other doctrines of property law, includ-

ing the prohibition on entails, the rule against perpetuities, and the rules on restraint of
alienation. And they do. See Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of
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future change it is highly unlikely that the legal system, which operates with very inexact knowledge of their private preferences and
subjective costs, can find a rule that works better than the one that
the parties themselves have agreed upon. In making this argument
in Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes,3 l I recognized
that requiring that all such covenants be respected does lead to the
problem of holdouts, but insisted that we take note of "what ownership means in the context of the fee simple absolute in possession,
'3 2
i.e., the right to hold out."
This basic point that freedom of contract should govern is, I
think, correct, but the matter of holdouts, and the bilateral monopoly problems they generate, does require more discussion than I
gave it in 1982. Initially, as a descriptive matter, it is quite clear
that the law does not always respect the holdout rights of an owner
against the rest of the world. The power of eminent domain is
designed, at least in cases of public use, to allow the state to force
persons to surrender their private property provided it compensates
them for their loss. Even in the private sphere there are some instances where, for example, a wrongdoer may be allowed to continue to maintain and operate a nuisance, so long as he pays his
victim tort damages (another form of just compensation) for the
property interest, thereby taking a "pollution easement." 33 For the
most part, however, the ability of private parties to "take and pay" is
sharply limited, for even in the nuisance cases injunctions are still
the dominant judicial remedy as courts are concerned with what has
been called the "private use of the eminent domain power."
The matter of restrictive convenants, however, involves a somewhat different issue. For here the effort to circumvent the private
property interest (perhaps even without compensation) is made, not
by an outsider, but by a party to the original transaction (or by his
privy). Even within the consensual setting there is no uniform rule
of specific performance as damages are the preferred remedy in a
wide range of cases; indeed there is very extensive discussion of
what rule is the ideal default in the contract setting. 3 4 The question
is whether the specific protection of property interests should exProperty, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 667, 703 (entail), 710 (perpetuities), 713 (restraints on alienation) (1986).
31
See Epstein, supra note 7.
32
Id. at 1366. In a similar vein, see Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Comments on Professors French and Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1403, 1412 (1982) ("The right
to 'hold out,' for whatever idiotic reasons, is an aspect of the right to hold property.").
33 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
34 Bishop, The Choice of Remedy for Breach of Contract, 14J. LEGAL SruD. 299 (1985);
Kronman, Specific Performance,45 U. CHL L. REV. 351 (1978); Schwartz, The Casefor Specific
Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979).
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tend to the full range of covenants. In general, I think that the answer is that specific protection should often remain but only as one
of a mixed bag of rules. The reasons for this conclusion should
make the connection between covenants and constitutions even
clearer.
Initially, it will be instructive to draw some distinctions between
the small and large number cases. Where there are, for example,
only two parties to a covenant, there is much to be said for the simple rule that protects it for all time and under all circumstances.
Thus the normal right of way over a servient tenement is generally
regarded as valid in perpetuity, just like the fee. To be sure, there
can be limitations upon the easement by contract, but as a constructional matter, the safe preference is to resist the application of the
changed circumstances doctrine and to enforce the easement so
long as the holder of the dominant tenement has not abandoned its
use. The holder of the servient tenement who wants release from
the easement must purchase it at an agreed price.
The more difficult issues arise at the other end of the spectrum
when the law of covenants is pressed into the service of modern
condominium and cooperative associations. In this context, should
the doctrine of changed circumstances have greater sway? As is so
often the case, it is critical to distinguish between the ex ante and ex
post effect of the rules. Ex post it is clearly in some people's interest
to have the right to hold out. This right may be awkward to exercise
when it is apparent that consent is withheld only to extract a profit
from others but it may nonetheless still have real positive value. In
many cases the covenant continues to be of some value to a covenantee. As there is no ready market value for the release of the covenant, the holdout can conceal his advantage taking as a defense the
subjective value he enjoys in keeping the covenant alive. Others'
inability to draw a clear operational line between subjective value
(thought good) and holdout value (thought bad) is great enough in
practice that the determined and subtle holdout artist has a good
deal of room to maneuver before he is detected and perhaps
disgraced.
From the ex ante perspective, however, the desirability of allowing holding out takes on a very different complexion. The developer will be able to command less total value from sales if the legal
arrangements that he sells give rise to a substantial holdout risk
some time in the future. We must assume that holdouts give rise to
negative sum games, for if bargaining were costless no one would
care about the problem. Confronting any holdout problems consumes administrative resources, and this necessarily reduces the total gains from removing covenants-assuming that it does not block
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their removal altogether. The developer who can find a way to limit
holdout problems will therefore be able to command a higher total
price for the units that he sells than one who cannot. We should
therefore expect him to take some effort in that direction, even if
preventing the holdout problem from arising is itself a task that consumes resources. The gains from investing in legal structure are
likely to be substantial.
Just such an effort is made in fashioning the rules whereby covenants can be modified or removed. The holdout problem occurs in
its most extreme form when unanimous consent is necessary to release lands from the restrictions imposed by covenants. The problem is identical to that which any organization, governmental or
voluntary, faces when it can pass a law or resolution only by unanimous consent. Most voluntary groups recognize this problem. In
response to it, they provide by originalunanimous consent for a set of
decision rules that allows some fraction, usually a majority by legal
interest or number, to reverse the original decisions. So long as it is
not possible to forecast perfectly, some such discretion will be
needed in any system of governance. Majority rule can be introduced into networks of covenants that are part and parcel of building plans, and frequently is. In some cases where the restrictions
are largely negative in type, it may be possible for any party to the
covenants, upon the signature of some fraction of the total units, to
free his own unit from the restrictions in question. Thus we can find
majority rule provisions for modification without government command. In other cases where the interdependence between the units
is greater, it might be necessary for the party to run through formal
deliberation in a forum provided for in the original agreements.
The connection between covenants and constitutions should
now be explicit. In both cases the ultimate task is to protect individual rights to property without inviting excessive holdout problems.
A rule that allowed a majority of unit owners to do whatever it
pleased with regard to restrictive covenants in place would rightly
be perceived as unfair: there would be too much scope for advantage taking. It would be quite unthinkable for the majority to be
able to vote to release all its units from the force of the covenants
while continuing to impose those covenants upon others; this would
be indistinguishable from a corporation's majority shareholders voting a dividend for themselves and denying it to the minority, or
from the majority of citizens voting to confiscate the property of
some minority faction. But by the same token, any absolute protection of individual rights with an individual veto re-introduces the
same problem of holdout that every system of collective governance
wishes to overcome.
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We therefore are driven to some mixed system of entrenched
rights, compensation tests, and majority rule-all messy, and all
necessary. The easy cases, as the law of eminent domain makes
clear, are those where the majority votes to change the applicable
covenants in a way that binds it equally with the minority. These are
cases in which the collective decisions are likely to have a proportionate impact upon members of the majority and minority alike.
The more suspicious cases are those where the change in legal protections have systematically and intentionally skewed effects. Here
the disproportionate impact gives rise to the same concerns as are
voiced with takings law generally.3 5 The difficult cases are those
that fall in between, where the disproportionate impact may be un36
intended and unavoidable, but is nonetheless substantial.
The choices involved are both vexing and important, and I
shall not try to choose in the abstract among veto rights, majority
rule, compensation, and their many variations and combinations.
Instead my point is more modest. So long as we know that the original owner of the property was aware of these difficulties, then the
basic analysis still holds: there is no need for any public doctrine of
changed conditions to limit the scope and effect of private covenants. The intermediate solutions found in the standard agreements are likely those that, in the long run, tend to minimize the
total breakdown. In this light, it becomes all the more dangerous
simply to invalidate a covenant on a wholesale basis, and thereby to
ignore the explicit protections that the parties themselves have
drafted, including those that allow for introducing some change in
the existing structure.
Of course, the parties' inability to draft with perfect foresight
and completeness necessarily means that courts will have to engage
in some "interstitial legislation" in construing the terms of the basic
agreement.3 7 No set of agreements governs all contingencies and
something has to be done to fill up the gaps. In many instances the
theory of the "implied term" does reflect the standard usages of the
parties to a transaction. In other cases, the implied term looks more
like a judicial invention and less like an explication of the parties'
intention. For example, we could say with some confidence that a
court's construction of a homeowners' association provision was inconsistent with the parties' intention if it worked a systematic redis35

See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960). I have discussed this point at

length in R. EPsTEN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN,

ch. 14 (1985).
36 Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982)
37 See id. at 1535-39 for illustrations having to do with "rezoning" subareas within
the association, changes in the financing charges for water connections, and restrictions
against children's occupancy.
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tribution among the association's members, because such rules, if
explicit to the agreement, would reduce the total value of the units
sold at the outset. 38 Again, the parallel to basic constitutional interpretation seems too clear to require much elaboration.
At bottom, the problems of homeowners' associations are
identical to those of all long term relational contracts: how should
the gaps be filled? While there is of necessity some role for judicial
intervention, there is an important question as to how much. In one
sense the argument turns on who can make the best decision about
whether to change or enforce covenants.
In many instances this problem might be viewed as one of institutional competence: do parties by agreement have a better sense
of what is going on than do courts? Without majority rule provisions, it could be suggested that courts may do a better job than the
parties because courts' information is better, even if their incentive
to get things right is weaker. But where the parties have internal
governance structures in place, these tend to undercut the judicial
advantage by allowing homeowners' associations to defer the time
of collective choice until they have the needed information. While
there is doubtless some small place for the doctrine of changed conditions to operate on agreements that are incomplete, it should have
at best a tiny importance once governance structures are in place.
Related to the matter of party competence is the problem of generations that always arises with long term contracts. Professor Sterk
has voiced concern about the problem: "Because the present generation cannot know what preferences the future generation will have,
and because there is no medium for exchange between generations,
it is impossible to ascertain whether and to what extent social investment by the present generation will actually increase the utility of
future generations." 3 9 His argument is a two-edged sword, for it
also shows that there is a cost to not respecting the covenants in
place when the future generation would have wanted them. All that
we can know is that the present generation thinks that the future
value of a common development will be maximized if it takes (as in
practice it does take) an intermediate approach to the problem of
changed conditions. The members of the present generation have
incentives to worry about future value because they want to sell
their units, or leave them by gift or bequest to their children. They
are also aware of the difficulties of dealing with future uncertainty.
38 See id. at 1544. The prospect of redistribution introduces an added element of
uncertainty that risk averse persons avoid and raises the prospect that additional sums
will be spent to obtain uncompensated transfers. These two costs operate as a lien on
the original units which can only reduce effective demand and, therefore, price.
39
Sterk, supra note 25, at 636-37.
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The governance structure they have created allows them to make
the substantive decisions, not when they originally acquire the units
from the developer, but at some later time when they have greater
information about what should be done. Again, it is possible to accept some judicial intervention where the network of covenants is so
incomplete as to lack a governance structure, but such intervention
under the doctrine of changed conditions is much trickier, and more
dubious where that governance structure is in place. With any
majoritarian structure in place, the risks are less those of holdout,
and more those of confiscation. In that environment, it is unlikely
that the covenants that do remain are best removed even if conditions have changed. Invalidation of covenants should be a rare
event where majority rule procedures are in place.
Now it may be said that, even if these points are correct, the
problem of externality still remains, for the governance structure
that is ideal for the covenantees may not be ideal for society at large.
But here the concern is overstated. In the first instance, the covenants that are created here are not fully inalienable. Persons who
want to leave the development are free to sell their units and thus to
remove themselves from the network of covenants. The price they
can collect will reflect in part the soundness of the governance structure that their purchasers will inherit. If these incentives are really
insufficient to foster responsible decisionmaking, then there is an
argument not only for overriding private agreements on the problem of changed conditions, but also for socializing all other forms of
investment. The owner who decides not to repair his unit because
he wants to take a vacation trip also imposes some costs on future
generations. So does every public and private person who chooses
consumption over investment. We allow individuals to choose between present and future precisely because they internalize both
sets of gains and losses, which is what happens in the case of covenants. If the owner is not allowed to choose between repairs and
vacations, then someone else will have to do so. Yet public officials
are often more worried about re-election than they are about longterm preservation of property or wealth; unlike private owners, they
are not disciplined by the knowledge that the value of their own
holdings drops when they pay insufficient attention to future gains
and losses-be they in routine maintenance or governance structures. Even if some public intervention were desirable, it is highly
doubtful that it should come in the form of a sporadic interference
with private governance arrangements. Instead, some shift in the
general laws of taxation applicable to both ordinary residences and
homeowners' associations would seem preferable.
The problem of future generations does not arise because of

HeinOnline -- 73 Cornell L. Rev. 925 1987-1988

926

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 73:906

any defect in the system of private ownership. It arises because
long-term relational contracts cannot costlessly predict and control
the future. It arises because it is never possible for unborn or minor
children to have a full say today about their futures. The problems
here are well known to any person who has ever lived in a condominium or cooperative but are only one side of the coin. There are
also the gains that these arrangements offer. The system of private
governance on balance works pretty well, if only because the only
available alternative is highly discretionary public control, disciplined by neither the bequest motive nor the resale market. The
doctrine of changed conditions should not become the entering
wedge of a large-scale system ofjudicial control over private homeowners' associations.
CONCLUSION

It should be evident in conclusion that covenants, far from being in opposition to constitutions, are really a special case of them.
The central problem with both is to find a way to bind a large
number of persons to a common plan for their mutual good extending over several generations. With covenants the system of private voluntary contract is often available because of the happy
circumstance that a single person owned the property outright
before initial subdivision and development took place. Given this
initial distribution of property rights, a system of front-end voluntary exchanges that can consensually link persons together can also
minimize serious back-end holdout problems that will necessarily
arise in practice. Forming a public constitution is far trickier business, because unanimous front-end consent is never possible in the
world of politics, so that the founders, like our Founders, must take
some liberties with the system in order to produce a viable result.
Indeed one area in which our Founders took the greatest liberties
was with choosing the number of states needed to ratify our new
40
Constitution.
40
U.S. CONST. art. VII provides: "The Ratification of the Conventions of nine
States shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so
ratifying the Same."
A fair reading of the Articles of Confederation made it clear that they could be
abrogated only by the unanimous consent of all the states. Once Rhode Island failed to
show up, the remaining states could have gone home. But they stayed and drafted a new
constitution that took effect when 9 of the 13 states ratified the constitution, but only, we
are told, "between the States" that so ratified. This last concession allowed to dissenting states to stay outside the orbit of the new constitution, but it denied them the previous right to have everyone abide by the Articles of Confederation. Yet the ploy worked
because the gains from union were too large, even for the original dissenter. For an

account of the difficulties it raises, see the discussion in H.
FEDERALISTS WERE FOR, ch. 1 (1981).

STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-
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We will understand far better what can go wrong with constitutions if we look first to see what analogous problems arise in the
voluntary institutions of government that private covenants foster.
We shall have some greater confidence in the'soundness of our own
constitutional order if we see in its uneasy mix of structural protections, voting rules, and entrenched individual rights the same array
of devices that private parties have used in order to determine the
fate of their own common ventures. The connection between covenants and constitutions is not only alliterative. It is also functional.
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